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Complexity theory or more precisely, computational complexity theory (cf. Papadimitriou 
1994), tries to classify problems according to the complexity of algorithms solving 
them. Of course, we can think of various ways of measuring the complexity of an al-
gorithm, but the most important and relevant ones are time and space. That is, we think 
we have a type of machine capable, in principle, to carry out any algorithm, a so-called 
general purpose machine (or, general purpose computer), and we measure the com-
plexity of an algorithm in terms of the time or the number of steps needed to carry 
out this algorithm. By space, we mean the amount of memory the algorithm uses. 
Time bounds yield (time) complexity classes consisting of all problems solvable by an 
algorithm keeping to the time bound. Similarly, space complexity classes are obtained. 
It turns out that these definitions are quite robust in the sense that, for reasonable 
time or space bounds, the corresponding complexity classes do not depend on the 
special type of machine model chosen. 
 But are the resources time and space tied to the inherent mathematical complexity 
of a given problem? We can try to classify problems also in terms of the complexity of 
formal languages or logics that allow to express the problems (e.g., if problem P2 is 
expressible in second-order logic but not in first-order logic then it is more complex 
than a problem P1 expressible in first-order logic). We speak of descriptive complexity the-
ory (cf. Ebbinghaus & Flum 1999, Immerman 1999), if we have in mind this kind of 
investigations. It is plausible that problems that are harder to check, i.e., problems that 
are of higher computational complexity, might be harder to express, i.e., are of higher 
descriptive complexity. What is surprising is how close the relationship between com-
putational and descriptive complexity is. In fact, the most important classes of compu-
tational complexity have descriptive characterizations. Hence, the computational com-
plexity of a problem can be measured in terms of the richness of a logic needed to 
express this problem. These results show that (as Neil Immerman states it in Immer-
man 1999) “time and space are not model-dependent engineering concepts, they are 
more fundamental”. 
 However, descriptive characterizations of complexity classes have been criticized 
for being merely simple translations of the original machine-based definitions of the 
classes into a logical formalism and therefore, for not providing new insights. Al-
though it is certainly true that the logical characterizations are often very close to the 
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machine descriptions, we do not agree with this criticism. We think that the descrip-
tive characterizations are important in various respects: 
• Characteristic features of the logic may be seen as characteristic features of 
the complexity class described by it and may add to a better understanding of 
this class. 
• They may help to recognize that a concrete problem is in a given complexity 
class (by expressing it in the corresponding logic). Moreover, one can view the 
logics involved as higher programming languages for problems of the corre-
sponding complexity class (since in all concrete descriptive characterizations 
one easily sees how to convert a sentence of the logic into an algorithm ac-
cepting the class of its models and satisfying the required resource restric-
tions). 
• The descriptive characterizations allow to convert problems, methods, and 
results of computational complexity theory into logic and vice versa, thus 
widening the methodological possibilities for both sides. 
 There is a further way to define complexity classes: Starting from a problem P0, 
mostly one takes a problem P0 of central importance in a given context, one considers 
the class of all problems reducible to P0, where reducibility is defined in an appropriate 
way. In fact, various classes of so-called parameterized complexity theory (cf. Downey 
& Fellows 1999), a new branch of complexity theory, have been defined in this way. 
For some of these classes, descriptive characterizations (but no machine-based charac-
terization) are known (cf. Flum & Grohe 2002) and have led to isolate and to under-
stand better the essential features of these classes. 
 Moreover, these results show that not always descriptive characterizations are mere 
translations of machine-based characterizations, since, as we just remarked, in some 
cases no simple and natural machine descriptions of these parameterized classes are 
known. 
 The purpose of this article is to give an insight into the nature of results of descrip-
tive complexity. We assume some acquaintence with logic but try to keep knowledge 
of complexity theory to a minimum. 
1 Automata 
We start with the -historically first- logical characterization of a complexity class. Of-
ten, this class is not considered to be a class of computational complexity theory, since 
it is not defined in terms of time or space restrictions of a general purpose machine, 
but it is obtained by restricting the “hardware” of the machine: We consider automata. 
We want to show that the class of problems recognized by automata coincides with 
the class of problems definable in monadic second-order logic. It turns out that this 
simple case already reflects some of the crucial aspects encountered in the descriptive 
characterizations of “real” complexity classes. 
 By å we always denote a finite alphabet, i.e., a finite set of letters or symbols. Then, 
å+ is the set of (finite and nonempty) words (or, strings) over å. If å={0,1} then 01101 
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is a word over å. If w1:=010 and w2:=11011 then we denote by 1 2w w  the concatena-
tion of w1 and w2, w1w2= 01011011. 
 A problem (or, language) P on S is a set of words over S, PÍå+. E.g., for å={0,1}, 
Peven(0):={wÎå+| w contains an even number of 0’s} and P0=1:={wÎå+| w contains as 
many 0’s as 1’s } are problems. 
 Automata are machines with restricted memory and with restricted reading capa-
bilities, more precisely, an automaton A  over the alphabet S is given by a finite set Q, 
the set of states, an element q0 of Q, the starting state, a subset F of Q, the set of final 
(or, accepting) states and a function d:Q×S®Q, the transition function. The intuitive 
meaning of d (q, a)=q0 is: If the automaton is in state q and reads a, then it passes to 
state q0. 
 The function d induces a function °d :Q×å+®Q, the meaning of °d (q, w)=q0 be-
ing: If the automaton is in state q and reads w letter by letter, then it ends in state q0, 
more formally, °d (q,w) is defined by induction on the length of the word w:  
If =w a Î S , then ° ( ) ( ), : ,q a q ad d=  
if w va= , then ° ( ) ° ( )( )d d d=, : ,q w q v a  
 An automaton A  accepts the word w if, in state q0, A  reads w, it ends in a state of 
F, i.e., if °d (q0,w)ÎF. 
( ) { }: |  accepts P w w+= Î SA A  
is the problem accepted by A . 
 For example, consider the automaton 0A  with 
  { } { }even odd 0 even even: , ,  : ,  :Q q q q q F q= = =  
and with 
( ) ( )d deven odd even even,0 :=  ,1 :=q q q q ; 
( ) ( )d dodd even odd odd, 0 := ,1 :=q q q q . 
 One easily verifies that 0A  accepts Peven(0), P( 0A )=Peven(0). It can be shown that 
there is no automaton accepting the problem P0=1:={wÎå+| w contains as many 0’s 
as 1’s}, the main reason being that any automaton only has a finite number of states 
and no writing capability and hence, when reading a {0, 1}-word, it cannot memorize 
the number of 0’s and the number of 1’s (or the difference of both numbers). 
 We aim to show or at least to understand the following result linking the measure 
“being accepted by an automaton” from computational complexity to the measure 
“being definable in monadic second-order logic” from descriptive complexity: 
A problem PÍå is accepted by an automaton just in case it is definable in 
monadic second-order logic. 
 What does “P is definable in monadic second-order” logic mean? Given å we con-
sider the vocabulary tå:={<,S,(Pa)aÎå, min, max} consisting of the binary relation 
symbols <, S, the unary relation symbols Pa for aÎå, and the constant symbols min, 
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max. For a word w=a1...an of length n let Bw:=({1,...,n},<w,Sw, ( waP )aÎå, minw, maxw) be 
the word model associated with w, i.e., the tå-structure with universe {1,...,n}, where <w 
denotes the natural ordering on {1,...,n}, Sw={(i,i+1)|1£i£n-1} is the successor rela-
tion, minw=0 and maxw=n, and where waP ={i|ai=a} is the set of positions of w carry-
ing the letter a. 
 We denote by FO and by MSO the set of formulas of first-order logic and of monadic 
second-order logic. In addition to first-order logic, monadic second order logic contains 
monadic (unary) relation variables, called set variables. 
 These variables can be quantified, universally or existentially, then ranging over all 
subsets of the given universe. Now, we can give a precise formulation of the result 
above-mentioned: 
Theorem 1.1 (Büchi 1960, Elgot 1961) 
Let å be an alphabet and PÍå+. 
 Then the following are equivalent: 
(i) There is an automaton A  accepting P, i.e. P( A )=P. 
(ii) There is a monadic second-order sentence j of vocabulary tå such that for every 
wÎå+, 
wÎPÛBwj. 
Proof: We sketch a proof. First assume that there is an automaton A  accepting P. We 
just describe in MSO that there is an accepting computation of A  (nearly in all char-
acterizations to come, one argues similarly for this direction): For every state 
qÎQ:={q0,..., qm} of A  we use a monadic second-order variable Xq for the subset of 
the universe corresponding to the positions where the automaton is in state q before 
reading the letter at this position. The sentence we aim at has the form 
( )
0 0
... ,...,
m mq q q qX X X Xy$ $ , 
where ( )
0
,...,
mq qX Xy is a formula (with no second-order quantifiers) expressing that 
A  starts in q0, behaves according to its transition function, and finally ends in an ac-
cepting state. Let us write down this formula explicitly for the automaton 0A  accept-
ing ( )
even oddeven(0) : ,q qP X Xy  is the following formula (we write Xe for evenqX  and X0 
for 
oddqX ):  
"x(Xex«ØXox)ÙXeminÙ"x"y(Sxy®((XexÙPox)®Xoy) 
 Ù(XexÙP1x)®Xey) 
 Ù(XoxÙP0x)®Xey)  
 Ù(XoxÙP1x)®Xoy) 
 Ù((XomaxÙPomax)Ú(XemaxÙP1max)) 
(the last line takes care of the last letter of the given word). Now it should be clear that 
for wÎå+, 
wÎPevenÛBw$Xe$X0y(Xe, Xo). 
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 For the other direction we need some notation. For jÎMSO we denote by qr(j) 
the quantifier rank of j, i.e., the maximal number of nested quantifiers in j; e.g., 
qr(j)=2 for j:=$x("XXxÙ$zQzx). 
 For wÎå+,and r Î¥ let 
MSOr(w):={jMSO-sentence|qr(j)£r, Bwj} 
be the set of sentences of MSO of quantifier rank £r valid in Bw, the r-theory of w. 
 We use the following two facts (the first one can be proved using, for example, the 
Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé method, a model-theoretic method (e.g. compare Ebbinghaus & 
Flum 1999); the second one holds, since for every r, up to logical equivalence, there 
are only finitely many sentences of MSO of quantifier rank £r, a fact that is easily 
shown by induction on r): 
(1) If MSOr(w)=MSOr(w') and aÎå, then MSOr(wa)=MSOr(w'a). 
(2) For fixed r the set Tr:={MSOr(w)| wÎå+} of r-theories of words over å is 
finite. 
 We come to a proof of the direction of (ii) to (i). So we assume that for the mo-
nadic second-order sentence j of vocabulary tå we have for every wÎå+:  
wÎPÛBwj. 
 Set r:=qr(j). Let A  be the automaton with Q:=Tr
·
U {q0}. So, the set of states is 
the set of r-theories together with an additional state q0, which is the starting state of 
A . The transition function d is given by  
d(q0,a):=MSOr(a) 
d(MSOr(w),a):=MSOr(wa) 
 d is well-defined by (1). Finally, we set F:={MSOr(w)|jÎ MSOr(w)}. An easy in-
duction (on the length of w) shows that °d (q0,w)=MSOr(w) and thus, 
wÎP ÛBwj 
 ÛjÎMSOr(w) 
 ÛMSOr(w)ÎF 
 Û °d (q0,w)ÎF 
 ÛwÎP( A ), 
i.e., P=P( A ).         ÿ 
 The characterization of the previous theorem can be used to get the decidability of 
the monadic second-order theory of words (using results that more or less are trivial 
for automata). On the other hand these investigations also led to so-called automata 
on infinite words and automata on infinite trees; they allowed to study the monadic 
second-order theory of corresponding structures and also led to decidability results for 
some interesting mathematical theories and for several logics of programs. 
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2 Time-bounded algorithms 
In the following discussion the reader can everywhere replace “algorithm” by Turing 
machine (or program for a Turing machine) or by any other general purpose machine 
model he is familiar with. Indeed, the concepts to be introduced are robust with re-
spect to the type of (general purpose) machine model chosen. 
 Let PÍå+ be a problem. Suppose that an algorithm takes 22
w
steps to decide 
whether wÎP. Then, even for quite short w, this algorithm cannot be performed in 
practice even with the fastest computers. Thus, it is conceivable that a problem P is 
“theoretically”, but not “practically” solvable by an algorithm, since all algorithms de-
ciding membership in P are too costly, since they need too many computation steps or 
too much memory. In fact, even for å={0, 1}, one can show the existence of such 
problems. 
 Denote by PTIME all problems that are solvable in polynomial time, i.e., all problems 
P such that there is an algorithm A and a polynomial p(x) such that for all words w, 
1. wÎPÛA accepts w; 
2. the algorithm A, on input w, stops after £p(|w|) steps. 
 Here, |w| denotes the length of the word w. 
 The importance of PTIME resides in the opinion that P coincides with the class of 
problems that can be realistically solved by computers. Therefore, one often identifies 
the “practically solvable” problems with the problems in PTIME. This “Church’s 
Thesis of practical computability” can only be justified to a certain extent: note, for 
example, that no restriction is imposed on the degree or the coefficients of the poly-
nomials. But experience shows that, as far as problems in practical applications (or 
problems that arise naturally in mathematics) are concerned, essentially the existence 
of an algorithm executable in practice corresponds to the existence of a polynomially 
bounded algorithm. This experience is summarized in (Downey & Fellows 1999) as 
follows: “When we can do anything clever at all, we can usually achieve polynomial-
time complexities with small exponent polynomials. This can be regarded as a fasci-
nating empirical fact about the ‘natural’ world of computational complexity”. 
 Clearly, any problem P accepted by an automaton is in PTIME: In fact, an automa-
ton A  with P( A )=P is an algorithm deciding wÎP in |w| steps. For many important 
problems it is still open if they are in PTIME. We give an example. Let G=(G, EG) be 
a (finite) graph, that is, G is a t:={E}-structure, where E is a binary relation symbol; 
hence, EGÍG´G. The elements of G are the vertices of the graph. If EGab, we say that 
there is an arc from a to b. A graph is 3-colorable if we can color the vertices of G such 
that no adjacent vertices a, b, i.e., no a, b with EGab, are similarly colored. Is 3-
colorability in PTIME? To get a problem in the sense of the previous section we must 
encode structures by words over some alphabet. This can be done in a straightforward 
way. Since we already saw that words correspond to structures, it is consistent with 
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our exposition so far, if in the rest of the paper we view problems as classes of finite 
structures1. 
 It is not known if the class of 3-colorable graphs is in PTIME. But it is in 
NPTIME, the class of problems solvable by a nondeterministic algorithm in polyno-
mial time. In certain states such nondeterministic algorithms may have the choice be-
tween more than one possible behaviours (actions). By definition, a nondeterministic 
algorithm accepts a given input, if there is at least one run accepting the input (that is, in 
any nondeterministic step there is at least one choice of behaviour such that eventually 
the algorithm accepts the input). In a precise framework, Turing machines correspond 
to algorithms and nondeterministic Turing machines to nondeterministic algorithms. 
Nondeterministic Turing machines are obtained by relaxing the notion of Turing ma-
chine similarly as the notion of algorithm is generalized in order to get nondeterminis-
tic algorithms. Nondeterministic Turing machines are an unrealistic but theoretically 
important model of computation The class of 3-colorable graphs is in NPTIME: The 
algorithm starts with a series of nondeterministic steps where it guesses a coloring of 
all the vertices (say, to every vertex it assigns 0, 1, or 2) and then it (deterministically) 
checks whether adjacent vertices have distinct colors. 
 Clearly, PTIMEÍNPTIME. The question whether PTIME=NPTIME, the so-
called P=NP-problem, is still open. It is considered to be one of the most challenging 
problems of complexity theory, yet even of mathematics. 
 The class of 3-colorable graphs is axiomatized by the monadic second-order sen-
tence  
$X$Y$Z( 
"x(XxÚYxÚZx)Ù"x(Ø(XxÙYx)ÙØ(YxÙZx)ÙØ(XxÙZx))Ù 
"x"y(Exy®(Ø(XxÙXy)ÙØ(YxÙYy)ÙØ(ZxÙZy)))). 
 This is a 11S -sentence, i.e., a second-order sentence of the form 
$X1...$Xl 
where y has no second-order quantifiers and X1,...,Xl are (not necessarily monadic) 
relation variables. The following theorem generalizes this observation. It was the start-
ing point for the descriptive characterization of complexity classes. 
Theorem 2.1 (Fagin 1974) 
A class of structures is in NPTIME just in case it is axiomatizable by a 11S -sentence. 
 But what about PTIME? We obtain a characterization of PTIME by adding to 
first-order logic a so-called fixed-point operator (which resembles the µ-operator of 
classical recursion theory). We explain this operator by an example. 
 Consider a graph G= (G, EG). The sequence a0,..., an is a path from a to b of length n, if 
a=a0, an=b, and EGa0a1,..., EGan-1an. We write d(a, b)=n, if there is a path from a to b of 
                                                   
1 The reader familiar with descriptive complexity theory will realize that throughout the paper we do not 
address the problems that arise in absence of an order relation. 
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length n and there is no path from a to b of length k with k<n. In particular, d(a, a)=0. 
We write d(a, b)=¥, if there is no path from a to b. 
 Consider the formula  
j(x,y,X):=(x=yÚ$z(XxzÙEzy)). 
 It gives rise to a sequence F0, F1,... (more precisely, F0(j,G), F1(j, G)...) of subsets 
of G×G defined by  
F0:=Æ and Fn+1:={(a,b)ÎG´G|Gj[a,b,Fn]}, 
i.e., Fn+1 is the set of ordered pairs of elements of G that fulfill j in G, if we inter-
prete X by Fn. An easy induction shows that 
Fn:={(a,b)ÎG´G|d(a,b)<n}. 
 In particular, 
F0ÍF1ÍF2Í....      (1) 
 We denote by 
F+:={(a,b)ÎG´G|$n0"n³n0:(a,b)ÎFn}. 
 By (1), F+=ÈnÎNFn, i.e., 
F+:={(a,b)ÎG´G|d(a,b)<¥}. 
 Since Fn=Fn+1 implies Fn=Fn+1=Fn+2=...=F+ and since FnÍG×G for every n, we see 
that the fixed-point of the sequence is reached after at most |G|2 steps, i.e., after a 
number of steps which is polynomial in the size of G. Now, by definition, the formula 
of “fixed-point logic” 
"x"y[FPxy,Xj(x,y,X)] xy 
expresses that all pairs are in the fixed-point, i.e., 
G"x"y[FPxy,Xj(x,y,X)]xy Û for all a, b: d(a,b) < ¥ 
 Û G is connected. 
 We come to the general case. Let j(x1,..., xr,X) be an arbitrary formula of first-
order logic of vocabulary t with a second-order variable X of arity r. Suppose A is a t-
structure. Then j gives rise to the sequence F0(=F0(j,A)), F1,... defined by 
F0:=Æ and Fn+1:={(a1,...,ar)ÎAr|Aj[â,Fn]} 
(here â abbreviates the sequence a1,...,ar). The set 
F+:={(a1,...,ar)ÎAr|$n0"n³n0:(a1,...,ar)ÎFn} 
is called the (generalized) fixed-point of j in A. 
 Fixed-point logic consists of all sentences of the form "y1... "yr[ 1 .... ,FP rx x Xj ]y1... yr or 
of the form $y1...$yr[ 1 .... ,FP rx x Xj ]y1...yr. By definition, in the structure A they express 
that F+=Ar and that F+¹Æ, respectively2. 
                                                   
2 Usually, fixed-point logic is defined as the set of all formulas obtained from atomic ones by closing un-
der the first-order operations and under the fixed-point operation just introduced; but it turns out 
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 If j is positive in X, that is, no occurrence of X in j is in the scope of a negation 
symbol (and we only use the connectives Ø, Ù, Ú and the quantifiers $, "), then a 
simple induction shows that F0ÍF1ÍF2Í... and that F+= rAF . So in this case we only 
need a number of steps polynomial in the size of the structure to reach the fixed-
point. We call the corresponding fragment of fixed-point logic the positive fixed-point 
logic3. Indeed we have: 
Theorem 2.2 (Immerman 1986, Vardi 1982) 
A class of structures is contained in PTIME if and only if it is axiomatizable in positive fixed-point 
logic. 
 Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 yield the following purely logical reformulation of 
the P=NP-problem: 
Corollary 2.3 
PTIME=NPTIME If and only if (on ordered finite structures) every property expressible by a 11S -
sentence is expressible by a sentence of positive fixed-point logic. 
3 Space-bounded algorithms  
In Theorem 2.2 we only considered sentences of fixed-point logic that were positive 
in the fixed-point variable. What is the expressive power of full fixed-point logic? It 
turns out that it corresponds to the complexity class PSPACE (“polynomial space”). 
A problem P is in PSPACE, if there is an algorithm A and a polynomial p such that 
for every input the algorithm decides membership in P and the memory used by A 
(number of cells of the memory or the number of tape squares of a corresponding 
Turing machine) is bounded by p (size of the input). 
 Again consider a formula j(x1,...,xr,X) and a structure A. Denote Fn(j,A) by Fn. 
Since FnÍAr and the power set of Ar has ( )2
rA  elements, there are m,l£ ( )2 rA  with 
l³1 such that Fm=Fm+l. An easy induction shows that Fk=Fk+l holds for all k³m. 
Hence, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 1 2 2
: ...r r r rA A A AF F F F+
+ +
= Ç Ç Ç .    (2) 
 For any n, to calculate Fn+1 we just need Fn and not the whole sequence F0,...,Fn. 
Hence, as |Fn|£|A|r, we only need space polynomial in the size of A in order to cal-
culate F+ using (2)4. This is one direction of: 
                                                                                                                                 
that every such sentence is equivalent to a sentence of the form above-mentioned. In the literature, 
fixed-point logic is often called partial fixed-point logic. 
3 Since then the fixed-point F+ is the least fixed-point of the corresponding operation, this fragment is 
called least fixed-point logic in the literature. 
4 Note that the time will be exponential in the size of A. 
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Theorem 3.1 (Abiteboul & Vianu 1989) 
A class of structures is contained in PSPACE if and only if it is axiomatizable by a sentence of 
fixed-point logic. 
As a corollary of Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 3.1 we obtain the following logical re-
formulation of an open problem of complexity theory: 
Corollary 3.2 (Abiteboul & Vianu 1991) 
PTIME=PSPACE if and only if positive fixed-point logic and fixed-point logic have the same ex-
pressive power. 
 We give an axiomatization in fixed-point logic of a concrete class. For this pur-
pose, we consider a version of the Game of Life. Let t:={E,S} with binary E and 
unary S. Let G=(G,EG,SG), where (G,EG) is a undirected graph, i.e., 
(G,EG)"xØExxÙ"x"y(Exy®Eyx). 
 We interprete SG as the set of vertices hosting a live cell (of some species). Set 
S0=Æ, S1=SG, and for n>1, define Sn, the “nth generation”, by the following “repro-
duction rule”: For aÎG, aÎSn iff (i) or (ii) holds, where 
(i) aÎSn-1 and, in Sn-1, a has exactly two neighbors hosting a live cell; 
(ii) in Sn-1, a has at least three neighbors hosting a live cell. 
 Then, Sn=Fn(j, G) for the following formula j(x,Y) where the first two lines corre-
spond to (i), the third one to (ii), and the last one gives the right value to the first gen-
eration: 
(YxÙ$y$z((y¹zÙExyÙExzÙYyÙYz) 
 Ù"u((ExuÙYu)®(u=yÚu=z))) 
Ú$y$z$u(y¹zÙu¹zÙy¹uÙExyÙExzÙExuÙYyÙYzÙYu) 
  Ú(Ø$xYxÙSx). 
 The statement “there is a vertex that eventually hosts a live cell” can be expressed 
by the sentence of fixed-point logic: 
$x[FPx,Yj(x,Y)]x. 
 Hence, this sentence axiomatizes the class of structures G=(G,EG,SG) that contain 
a vertex that eventually hosts a live cell. By Theorem 3.1, this class is in PSPACE. 
 For our last characterization of a complexity class we come back to the formula 
j(x,y,X):=(x=yÚ$z(XxzÙEzy)). 
we analyzed at the beginning of Section 2, where we saw that the sentence 
"x"y[FPxy,Xj(x,y,X)]xy expresses connectivity in graphs. The formula j(x,y,X) can 
equivalently be rewritten as 
(x=yÚ$u$z(XuzÙu=xÙEzy)), 
which we abbreviate as 
(x=yÚ$uzÎX(u=xÙEzy)); 
hence, the corresponding fixed-point sentence expressing connectivity has the form 
"x"y[FPxy,X(y1(x,y)Ú$uzÎXy(u,z,x,y))]xy,    (3) 
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where y1 and y do not contain the variable X. Each tuple in a new stage of the fixed-
point process in (3), say in Fn+1, is already witnessed by a single tuple of the preceding 
stage Fn. Hence, (x,y)ÎFk if and only if there is a sequence (x1,y1),...,(xk,yk) with 
(xk,yk)=(x,y) and 
y1(x1,y1) and y(xi,yi,xi+1,yi+1) for i <k. 
 This yields a nondeterministic algorithm A that, given a structure B as input, 
checks whether B"x"y[FPxy,X(y1(x,y)Ú$uzÎXy(u,z,x,y))]xy: Since F0ÍF1Í..., we 
have 2BF F+ = . For every a,bÎB, the algorithm A, step by step, guesses the elements 
of a sequence (a1,b1),...,(ak,bk) with k£|B|2, (ak,bk)=(a,b), and with 
By1(a1,b1) and By(ai,bi,ai+1,bi+1) for i<k. 
 At every step of the computation the algorithm A only has to store the counter i, 
the previous guess (ai,bi), the actual guess (ai+1,bi+1), and the target tuple (a,b). Since we 
may assume that B={1,...,|B|} we need log |B| bits to name the elements of B in bi-
nary. Altogether, A needs £c × log |B| cells of memory to check if B satisfies the 
fixed-point formula in (3). 
 This can be generalized. Let t be an arbitrary vocabulary and consider a formula of 
the form 
( ) ( )( )11 .... , 1... ,rr x x Xy y FP x z X x z yy yé ù" " Ú $ Îë û .   (4) 
 In particular, neither y1 nor y contains X. Again, each tuple in a new stage of the 
fixed-point process, say in Fn+1, is already witnessed by a single tuple of the preceding 
stage Fn. Therefore, as in the preceding example, we see that the class of structures 
axiomatized by the sentence in (4) is in NLOGSPACE. By definition, a problem P is 
in NLOGSPACE, if there is an algorithm A just accepting the elements of P and if 
there is a constant cÎN such that for every input the memory used by A (besides the 
memory used to store the input) is bounded by c × log(size of the input). 
 Our previous observation shows the “easy” part of the following result. 
Theorem 3.3 (Immerman 1987) 
A class of structures is in NLOGSPACE if and only if it is axiomatizable in fixed-point logic by a 
formula of the form  
( ) ( )( )11 .... , 1... ,rr x x Xy y FP x z X x z yy yé ù" " Ú $ Îë û . 
 Immerman (Immerman 1988) used this characterization to obtain: 
Corollary 3.4 
NLOGSPACE is closed under complements. 
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